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14 August 2002  
 
1. The Keynes Before Keynes 
Milton Friedman (chapter 2 [1956], 3-4) asserted that “Chicago was one of the few 
academic centres at which the quantity theory continued to be a central and vigorous 
part of the oral tradition throughout the 1930’s and 1940’s”.  Friedman sought to 
“nurture” the revival of the quantity theory by linking it to this Chicago “oral 
tradition”.  According to Friedman the “flavor” of this oral tradition was captured in a 
model in which the quantity theory was “in the first instance a theory of the demand 
for money”.  Friedman added that to “the best of my knowledge no systematic 
statement of this theory as developed at Chicago exists, though much of it can be read 
between the lines of [Henry] Simons’ and [Lloyd] Mints’s writings”.  He also enlisted 
the names of Frank Knight and Jacob Viner in support of his assertion. 
 
It is inherently difficult to resolve a dispute over an oral tradition that may or may not 
have existed decades before.  Friedman began his Chicago graduate studies in autumn 
1932, and his primary exposure to Chicago monetary economics was through Mints’ 
Graduate Study of Money and Banking course (Economics 330).i  Don Patinkin 
carefully marshalled evidence from his own Chicago lecture notes (taken from Mints’ 
Economics 330 in summer 1944) and from contemporary Chicago writings and thesis 
titles.  Patinkin (chapter 6 [1972/1974], 115-6; chapter 5 [1969/1981], 246-7) 
concluded that Friedman’s use of the quantity theory differed significantly from 
interwar Chicago usage: “the basic assumption of the Chicago School analysis was 
that the velocity of circulation is unstable”.  Simons’ writings (beginning in 1933) 
“represent the Chicago tradition in its pristine – and pre-Keynesian – form”.  With 
respect to the demand function for money, Patinkin (chapter 6 [1972/1974], 115) 
asserted that Simons “never even mentioned this concept!”ii  However, Simons (1948 
[1946], 340, n4) stated that “Empirical evidence as to secular increases in the demand 
for money or liquidity is, however, a precarious basis for long term policy”.   
 
Patinkin (chapter 5 [1969/1981], 249) concluded that “by the 1940s the Chicago 
School had – quite understandably – been influenced by Keynesian monetary theory”.  
The relevant doctoral theses of the period “generally took [John Maynard] Keynes as 
their point of departure”.  Mints (1950) analysed the asset demand for money – but 
this analysis, Patinkin explained, was followed by “a special appendix on Keynes’ 
theory of liquidity preference”.  On two occasions, Patinkin (chapter 5 [1969/1981], 
256; chapter 19 [1986], 120) used Friedman’s (chapter 4 [1968], 439) reference to the 
modern reformulated quantity theory as having been “strongly affected by the 
Keynesian analysis of liquidity preference” as evidence that Friedman has been 
obliged to retreat from his original position.  Thus Michael Parkin (chapter 18 [1986]) 
was represented as “more Friedmanian than Friedman” for not accepting this as a 
“fact”. 
 
However, as Herbert Stein (1969, 133) put it, there was a “Keynes Before Keynes”.  
Lauchlin Currie (1972, 139, 141) considered himself “a Keynesian from way back … 
my theoretical approach had been influenced by Keynes since my London School of 
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Economics days in 1922-25”.  Currie (13 June 1979) informed Patinkin that in the 
early 1930s he was “using the Treatise in classes at Harvard”.iii  Erik Lundberg (1994 
[1934], 48, 51-2, 62) recalled that in Chicago in 1931-2, “Our speeches and 
discussions centred around the monetary formulations of the business cycles given by 
Hayek, Mises and Keynes … I dare say the Keynesian side mostly won the battles”.  
1933 cannot be characterised as “pre-Keynesian” in so far as the demand for money is 
concerned because that framework was already present in the Treatise on Money 
published in 1930.  Patinkin (chapter 16 [1981/1973], 282) “strongly suspected” that 
the Chicago “classroom teaching” of the 1940s “differed” from “that of a decade 
before” in some respects – but he apparently made no attempt to inspect Friedman’s 
1932 Economics 330 lecture notes.   
 
These 1932 lecture notes indicate that Friedman was exposed to a version of the 
quantity theory which stressed the importance of the demand for money.  Moreover, 
this version of the quantity theory was stated to be part of a (Cambridge) oral 
tradition.  In 1932, Mints’ placed great stress on Keynes’ Treatise on Money (1930) 
and to a lesser extent on Keynes’ Tract on Monetary Reform (1923) in which this 
Marshallian oral tradition was discussed.  In response to Patinkin, Friedman (chapter 
7 [1972/1974], 168; see also 1967, 8-9) maintained that “Keynes’s discussion of the 
demand curve for money in the General Theory is for the most part a continuation of 
earlier quantity theory approaches, improved and refined but not basically modified.  
As evidence, I shall cite Keynes’s own writings in the Tract on Monetary Reform 
(1923) – long before he became a Keynesian in the present sense”.  But like Patinkin, 
Friedman did not refer to his 1932 lecture notes.   
 
This chapter uses these lecture notes to resolve this long-standing dispute about the 
nature of inter-war Chicago monetary economics.  To avoid ambiguity, section 2 of 
this chapter provides a precise description of the aspects of the debate that can be 
regarded as resolved.  Section 3 examines the existing literature (including Patinkin’s 
work) which emphasised that the demand for money framework was, to a large 
extent, already present in the Treatise.  Sections 4, 5 and 6 describe the transmission 
process of the quantity theory money demand approach from Keynes to Friedman via 
Mints.  Section 4 examines the interactions between Keynes and the participants of 
the Harris Foundation lectures and seminars at the University of Chicago in 1931.  
Section 5 specifically examines the interaction between Keynes and Mints in Chicago 
in 1931.  Section 6 examines Friedman’s 1932 Economics 330 lecture notes and 
readings: 6.1 the course outline, 6.3 Friedman’s readings and lecture notes and 6.3 the 
reviews of the Treatise.  Section 7 outlines Friedman’s defence against Patinkin.  
Concluding comments are provided in section 8.     
 
2. Issues Resolved and Issues Not Resolved  
Since this essay purports to resolve this dispute it may be helpful to summarise the six 
issues that can be regarded as having being resolved (2.1-2.6).  No conclusive 
evidence, however, is offered with respect to Viner, Knight, Simons or Douglas (2.7).   
   
2.1 First, the documentary evidence clearly indicates that in 1932-3 Mints organised 
Economics 330 around Keynes’ Treatise.  The first words that Friedman wrote were 
“Econ 330 Keynes”.  Friedman then wrote that Mints concluded that “General 
Framework of Keynes likely to endure much longer than details”.  
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2.2 Secondly, within a few years the framework of the Treatise on Money had been 
replaced by the framework of what Arthur F. Burns (1946, 12) described as Keynes’ 
“treatise on unemployment equilibrium”.  When Burns wrote that in the “last decade 
the world has moved swiftly in a Keynesian direction” he was, of course, referring to 
the General Theory as the “Keynesian” framework that endured.  As Kenneth 
Boulding (1956, 141) put it, the 1936 Keynesian Revolution was “the Great Change 
in economics”.   
 
In the process, the Treatise came to be viewed as a stepping-stone in the “natural 
evolution” of Keynes’ (1936, vi) thought.  After 1936, much of the theoretical 
apparatus of the Treatise was “discarded” (Boulding 1956, 133).  Alvin Hansen 
(1936, 668, 686) in his Journal of Political Economy (JPE) review of the General 
Theory, noted that Keynes had now “wholly abandoned … the imposing edifice 
erected in a Treatise on Money”.  Hansen described economics as standing “in danger 
of a sterile orthodoxy”; but the General Theory would “stimulate thinking on fresh 
lines in the field of economic dynamics”.   
 
Roger Weiss (1 July 1987) wrote to Mints (on the occasion of his 100th birthday) to 
remind him that for post-1936 students “you worked your way patiently through the 
General Theory”.iv  By the time Patinkin attended Mints’ Economics 330 - in 1944 - 
the General Theory - not the Treatise - dominated monetary theory.  Mints apparently 
devoted one lecture (17 July 1944) to deriving the fundamental equations of the 
Treatise, and a part of a lecture (19 July 1944) to Keynes’ discussion of the market 
and natural rates of interest.  Mints concluded his discussion with “By now concept of 
‘natural rate’ pretty well evaporated”.v   
 
Keynes (1936, v) apologised in advance if his “controversy is itself too keen”.  The 
controversy over the Keynesian framework of the General Theory became more 
intense after the publication of Friedman’s (1956) Studies in the Quantity Theory of 
Money, until this alternative Chicago framework evolved into the “natural” rate 
counter-revolution and displaced its Keynesian competitor (Friedman 1968).  Even 
before this counter-revolution, Roy Harrod (1951, 404) noted that the publication of 
General Theory “greatly militated against the reading of the Treatise”.  One of 
Keynes’ American popularisers described the Treatise as being “confined to a 
pretentious monetary theory of the trade cycle” (Dillard 1948, 310).   
 
2.3 Thirdly, one of the novel features of Keynes’ work in the Treatise was an 
increased emphasis on money demand in a revised quantity theory framework.  Like 
his followers (including Patinkin), Keynes (1936, 343-4) sought “a genuine synthesis” 
– but Keynes’ emphasis, in this context, was the synthesis between the “twin quantity 
theories” one of which sought to determine the price level (or “value in exchange”) 
and the other which sought to determine the rate of interest (or the “value in use”).  
This specific synthesis was, as Friedman put it, “a continuation of earlier quantity 
theory approaches, improved and refined but not basically modified”.  Patinkin (16 
November 1959) complained to Friedman that “to me it seems that with perhaps one 
exception (Karl Schlesinger) an exposition with the contents and spirit of yours could 
not have been written (and was not written) before Keynes.  I find it particularly 
difficult to accept your implication that your essay represents the kind of thing that 
was taught at Chicago by Knight, Viner, Simons and Mints.  My own recollections 
are different”.vi  Friedman’s 1956 essay could not have been written (and was not 
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written) before Keynes of the Treatise – but the publication of that book preceded 
Friedman’s training at Chicago.   
 
2.4 Fourthly, there was an important generational aspect to this dispute.  As Stein 
(1969, 162) noted, both Paul Samuelson and Boulding responded to Keynes with 
“Wordsworthian or Keatian emotions”.  Both described their feelings using the words 
“Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive, but to be young was very heaven”.  Samuelson 
(1915-) was describing his reaction to the General Theory; Boulding (1910-95) was 
describing his reaction to the Treatise.  Both were twenty-one when they encountered 
these respective books.  Friedman (1912-) was twenty when he attended Mints’ 330 
course; Patinkin (1922-95) was twenty-two.   
 
Boulding (1956, 133) recalled that he would “never forget the excitement, as an 
undergraduate [at Oxford] of reading Keynes’ Treatise on Money in 1931”.  He 
recounted to his biographer that the Treatise provoked “a spiritual experience as well 
an intellectual one … now the world made sense; history made sense for the first 
time” [emphasis in original].  One of the unpleasant shocks he received upon taking 
up his first teaching position was that in Edinburgh, in autumn 1934, “Keynes had 
scarcely been heard of” (Kerman 1974, 104-5, 242).   
 
Boulding spent the intervening period (1932-4) as a graduate student at Chicago.vii  
He was not impressed with much of the formal teaching but wrote to a friend “There 
are a large number of Bright Young Men in the graduate school.  We meet every 
week in a seminar to rend Mr Keynes” (cited by Kerman 1974, 236-7).  George 
Stigler (1988, 25) recalls that students and junior faculty “of whom Albert G. Hart 
was the most prominent, organised a seminar and invited a stream of visiting scholars 
(Oskar Lange and Fritz Machlup, among others) to give talks that led to remarkable 
stimulating discussions”.  Economics Chairman Harry Millis was prepared to 
transform this seminar into a departmental course; but given the state of 
“extraordinary intellectual ferment” that existed among the students, they declined for 
fear that their autonomy might be undermined.  
 
Friedman, Stigler, and Allen Wallis (1993) avidly discussed the idea they were 
exposed to.  Indeed, Milton and Rose Friedmans’ (1998, 35, 39-40) “most vivid 
memory” of their fellow graduate students was Boulding and Hart vigorously 
debating: “Both believed it was wasteful for only one person to talk at a time”.  
Friedman (correspondence to the author, 15 February 2002) has reiterated that Boulding 
was a dominant influence among graduate students at Chicago; a status that may have 
been reinforced by his having already published in Keynes’ Economic Journal 
(Boulding 1932).  
 
Hart (1948, vii) located in John Hicks’ (1935) article on ‘A Suggestion for Simplifying 
the Theory of Money’ the “most direct intellectual influence” on his own Money, Debt 
and Economic Activity.  Hicks (1935, 3) emphasised the marginal portfolio analysis in 
the Treatise, as “the most important part of [Keynes’] theoretical contribution”.  Hart 
(1948, vii, 167) described Keynes as “the most fertile monetary thinker of the 
interwar years”.  The revolution in monetary thinking occurred during Hart’s time at 
Chicago: “Down to the Great Depression of the 1930’s, the stability of velocity made 
this mechanistic [quantity-velocity] approach reasonable”.  However, with the 
breakdown of the stability of velocity, it was necessary to analyse “people’s motives 
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and plans; and this is more conveniently carried out in the framework of the payments 
approach and cash-balance approach”.  In the chapter on “The Cash-Balances 
Approach”, Hart (1948, 191-2) explained that “This chapter is about motives to hold 
cash … [this] approach has a long history and has been widely used – particularly in 
England … Among British economists of the twentieth century, Alfred Marshall, 
A.C. Pigou, D.H. Robertson and J.M Keynes (in the earlier stages of his monetary 
thinking) took this approach”.  Hart (1948, viii) also stressed the influence of Mints 
and Simons on his book.  
  
It therefore seems likely that Friedman took the ideas he was exposed to in Economics 
330 and used them as an organising framework with which to understand the 
‘macroeconomic’ dislocation of the 1930s.  If intense student discussion is admissible 
as an “oral tradition” then Friedman’s assertion has some validity.  A version of the 
quantity theory which was “in the first instance a theory of the demand for money” 
was apparently “a central and vigorous part of the oral tradition” at Chicago at least 
among graduate students in 1932-3 (and possibly until the General Theory made 
Keynes a suspect figure).   
 
2.5 Fifhly, Friedman’s initial assertion about Chicago uniqueness in this context must 
now appear unreliable.  The Treatise made a profound impression on a variety of 
economists in a variety of universities.  John Kenneth Galbraith (1971, 280) spent 
1931-4 at Berkeley where “Leo Rogin discussed Keynes with a sense of urgency that 
made his seminars seem to graduate students the most important things then 
happening in the world”.  Boulding (1956, 133) had a similar sense of excitement at 
Oxford in 1931.  In summer 1930, A.F. Plumptre left Cambridge with a hundred proof 
copies of the Treatise, from which he taught his University of Toronto students, 
including Lorie Tarshis (1977, 49).viii  When in 1932-3, Richard Kahn visited the 
United States (including a four week visit to Chicago) he reported to Keynes that 
“The Treatise plays an enormously prominent role wherever I go” (16 February 1933; 
cited by Marcuzzo 2001, 22).   
 
John Williams taught Money and Banking at Harvard (Mason 1982, 419).  In his 
forty-one page lead article review of the Treatise, Williams (1931, 549, 552-3, 559, 
580) noted in the Quarterly Journal of Economics that Keynes was “turning away 
from old versions of the quantity theory”.  In Williams’ view, Keynes’ primary 
innovation related to the composition of money demand: “a shift of deposits from 
demand to time deposits”.  Thus “the concept of the idle savings deposit, and the 
consequent distinction between saving and investment, underlie Keynes’ whole 
treatment and constitute a valid claim to his having broken new and significant 
ground in monetary theory”.  This was “an important advance.  Fisher’s equation, for 
example, deals exclusively with demand deposits.  So far as I know all theories 
previous to Keynes’ have failed to make use of the statistical division of deposits into 
demand and time … in monetary terms, the crux of the matter is that, while banks 
control the physical quantity of deposits, depositors control the spending of them, and 
changes in quantity may be offset by changes in velocity or in direction”.           
 
Joseph Schumpeter described the Treatise to Keynes (JMK XIII [1930], 201) as “a 
Ricardian tour de force” and as a result tore up his own uncompleted work on 
monetary theory (Moggridge 1992, 593).  Erik Lundberg (1994 [1934], 48, 51-2, 62) 
found that at Harvard in 1933, Schumpeter had “gathered around him a group of 
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young economists all working with modern monetary theories.  During the summer I 
had discussions with some of them, especially on monetary questions concerning the 
business cycle”.  This contrasted favourably with what Lundberg found in Chicago in 
1931-2.  With respect to business cycle theory, Lundberg thought that Chicago had 
“very little to offer.  Professor Mints touched on some aspects of the problem in his 
lectures on monetary theories”.   
 
It is therefore improbable that the Treatise – with its emphasis on money demand – 
informed ‘macroeconomic’ discussions in Chicago only.  Indeed, Friedman in the 
preface to these volumes has retreated from his initial assertion about Chicago 
uniqueness.  The chapters in Part 3 of this volume also tend to undermine the 
uniqueness assertion.    
 
2.6 There has been much speculation about Friedman’s motives.  He was clearly 
highly stimulated by the Chicago environment of the 1930s.  His teachers “left a 
unique imprint” on their students.  In this Chicago tradition “what mattered in 
intellectual discourse was only the cogency of the argument”.  After his return to 
Chicago in 1946, he self-consciously modelled his teaching style on Viner’s.  
Friedman’s (chapter 2 [1956]) essay introduced a collection of dissertations written by 
students from his Chicago Workshop in Money and Banking.  The purpose was “to 
supplement what I did with related work by students and colleagues.  This 
combination gave birth to what became known as the Chicago School of Monetary 
Economics” (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 35, 156-7; Friedman 1983, 211; Stigler 
1988, 156-7).   
 
Friedman sought to provide an enthusiastic “teamwork approach” for his Workshop 
(Hammond 1996, 47).ix  His pedagogical mission was “to fuel intensive discussion” 
(Friedman and Friedman 1998, 202, 35, 41, 49).  But one energising ingredient, 
present for Friedman’s generation, was missing for students of the 1950s: extreme 
macroeconomic dislocation.  The oral tradition linked the students of the second-
generation Chicago School to their predecessors, thus assisting the cultivation of an 
institutional affiliation.   
 
Friedman (1962a, viii) thought that his role was to act as an intellectual 
“matchmaker”.  Some of his students found his “magic” comparable in excitement to 
“a date with a beautiful woman” (Becker 1998).x  If his ‘Restatement’ exaggerated the 
degree of continuity with respect to earlier Chicago versions of the quantity theory 
this may have been a rhetorical flourish designed to provide an additional 
motivational stimulus to his students.  Friedman (chapter 2 [1956], 21, 4) emphasised 
“the part which students have played in keeping that tradition alive and vigorous”.  
That tradition “nurtured” his students’ essays. 
 
It was a highly successful pedagogical device.  Not only did Friedman produce a 
cohort of students committed to analysing macroeconomics through the quantity 
theory,xi some such as Robert Lucas (1976, 41) and Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace 
(1976, 169) constructed a third generation Chicago School “rules party”.  So potent 
was this teaching style that many others “picked up the Chicago business by osmosis” 
(Bork 1983, 196).  Stigler (1962, 71) claimed that Friedman was the intellectual 
leader, not merely of the Chicago School, but of a much broader church: the 
“Berkeley-Cambridge axis”. 
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2.7 This chapter does not purport to offer decisive evidence with respect to Knight, 
Simons, Viner or Douglas.  Prior to 1936, these Chicago economists may have used 
Keynes’ framework to analyse the Great Depression, orally, despite the paucity of 
published references.  Friedman’s cohort had extensive social and intellectual 
interactions with their teachers (Stigler 1983, 168; 1988, 19; Friedman 1983, 179; 
Wallis 1983, 179; Director 1983, 179; Minsky 1985, 220).  Paul Douglas (1931, 9; 
1933, 80) described the Treatise as “brilliant” and “The most stimulating single work 
on money”.  Viner (chapter 47 [1932], 504) concluded that the diagnoses and 
remedies contained in Keynes’ Essays in Persuasion were widely accepted as 
“substantially and brilliantly right”.  Moreover, Keynes stood “head and shoulders” 
above other economists as a “propagandist” whose work was “undiluted by academic 
scruples to disclose all the qualifications and the uncertainties of his logical 
argument”.  Keynes also displayed “fearlessness in assigning to his opponents their 
appropriately low intelligence quotas… Perhaps what the world has needed and most 
urgently needs today, is a few more Keynes”.  However, during a visit to Chicago, 
Kahn (15th January 1933) reported to Joan Robinson that Viner was “very proud of 
not having read more than a few passages from the Treatise”.xii   
 
With respect to post-war published work, Viner, as Mints (1950, 116-7) pointed out, 
was a “proponent of discretionary authority”.  Viner (1947, 210-1) proposed that 
“until better techniques are discovered, the problem of inflation and of deflation needs 
to be dealt with by improvisation, by ad hoc and prompt reactions to changes in 
circumstances as they occur rather than by fixed policies set long in advance in 
accordance with long-run forecasts”.xiii  Viner’s (1958 [1954], 365) use of the quantity 
theory was different from that asserted by Friedman: he defended the quantity theory 
against Schumpeter’s attacks, on the basis that the theory “is understood as holding 
only: (1) that an authority powerful enough to make the quantity of money what it 
pleases can so regulate that quantity as to make the price level approximate to what it 
pleases, and (2) that the possibility of existence of such a power is not inconceivable a 
priori”.  
 
Friedman (1962) and Viner (1962) both contributed essays to In Search of a Monetary 
Constitution.  Viner’s contribution to the rules versus discretion debate was entitled 
‘The Necessity and the Desirable Range of Discretion to be Allowed to a Monetary 
Authority’.  Viner concluded that it was impractical to conduct monetary management 
“in conformity with a ‘rule’”, in part, because in the US “the degree of 
decentralisation of direct and indirect control over the quantity and velocity of money, 
as well as of official powers to influence the supply of near-moneys and their 
velocities, is nothing short of fantastic” (1962, 273, 262; see also 1961, 232-3).  Viner 
(1962, 256-8, 261, 252) followed Simons in preferring the “flexible rule” and 
“judgment” associated with a price-level goal, brought about by variations in the 
money supply.  Indeed, the bulk of Viner’s paper was a highly critical commentary of 
Friedman’s x% money growth rule.  Viner could not “exorcise” from his mind 
Friedman’s “faith” and “claims”.  In Friedman’s analysis “an improbable constancy is 
being projected into the future … Staking our future on present prophesizing seems a 
high price to pay for escaping from the bondage of a discretionary authority”.xiv   
 
Knight (1964 [1948], xlv, xliii) also objected to the “whole project of making 
monetary theory the centre and starting point of systematic economics” in part 
because the “supply and demand curves for ‘liquidity’ have no solid foundation and 
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are not a solid basis for action but are ‘theoretical’ in the bad and misleading sense”.xv   
According to Knight (1941, 65) “that a monetary theory of interest should be 
defended by economists of repute is especially mysterious in view of the facts, which 
are directly contrary to what the theory calls for”.  Knight explained that “The 
monetary system can never be made automatic.  An approximate constancy in general 
prices, or in the relation between product prices and wages, can in the nature of the 
case be achieved only by deliberate action, based on constant attention, correcting or 
offsetting incipient tendencies to expansion or contraction”.  In the rules versus 
discretion debate over monetary policy, Knight (1960, 105) lent “rather strongly 
towards the side of administrative discretion and judgement, being sceptical about 
how far rules can be made in advance or especially how far they would be made 
wisely by the agencies that would in fact make them”. 
 
However, since this essay highlights the perils of the regression line approach to the 
history of thought, no definitive judgement is offered with respect to Douglas, Knight, 
Simons or Viner.  Likewise no definitive judgement is offered with respect to Mints’ 
written work.  Friedman’s primary exposure to monetary economics at Chicago was 
through Mints’ 330: the evidence presented here is sufficient to absolve him of the 
charges laid by Patinkin and Johnson.  However, constraints of space and time 
prohibit a systematic examination of these other aspects of the issue, which would, of 
course, be a valuable contribution to the literature.         
 
3. The Demand for Money prior to the General Theory 
To Friedman’s students he displayed “the missionary’s zeal in the worship of truth” 
(Becker 1991, 145).  Patinkin (to Hicks 19 August 1957) also shared an “open-
minded search for the truth”.xvi  Patinkin (chapter 5 [1969/1981], 242) sought to use 
the “true nature of the Chicago monetary tradition” as a powerful weapon to attack 
Friedman.  But in a letter to Phillip Cagan commenting on his forthcoming 
contribution to Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money (Cagan 1956), Patinkin (16th 
May 1955) modestly acknowledged what he regarded as an intellectual weakness: 
“seeing how my own thinking frequently gets compartmentalized – and fails to 
recognize in one context what it recognizes in another”.xvii   
 
What Patinkin apparently failed to adequately realise – in the compartment of his 
dispute with Friedman - is that the General Theory created a structural break in 
Chicagoan reactions to Keynes and that the concept of liquidity preference was 
largely contained in the Treatise.  The history of monetary economics – like the 
Keynesian Neoclassical Synthesis - develops through “irony” and “error” (Patinkin 
1952, 269-70).xviii       
 
Patinkin (1981, 3, 16-7, 247, n17) was at Chicago between 1941-7, the last two years 
as a doctoral student and research associate at the Cowles Commission.  He used his 
recollections of these years to further undermine Friedman’s assertion: “In so far as 
the empirical estimation of the demand function for money was undertaken at 
Chicago, it was done so under the auspices of the Keynesian model builders of the 
Cowles Commission, which was then located at the University of Chicago.  See in 
particular Lawrence Klein [1947, 1950a]”.  At Cowles “Truth in the form of 
maximum-likelihood estimates identified and enthroned” battled “Error in the form of 
simultaneous equation error … Armed with this truth Lawrence Klein developed his 
econometric models of the United States economy (1947, 1950[a])”.    
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In 1944, as Patinkin attended Mints’ Economics 330, Klein, supervised by 
Samuelson, wrote his MIT doctoral dissertation on the Keynesian Revolution.  
Patinkin (1981 [1947], 155, n) read and commented on what he described as Klein’s 
“excellent” thesis in manuscript form.  In his discussion of the General Theory, Klein 
(1950b, ix, 97, 8, 16) emphasised that “the interest theory of this system is the 
solution to the entire set of equations which is based on the liquidity-preference 
building block [emphasis in original]”.   But Klein also emphasised that “the major 
theoretical innovation of the Treatise was an analysis of the functions of money and 
the motives which lead people to hold cash balances … the foundations of Keynes’ 
later liquidity preference theory of interest”.   
 
Klein’s (1950b, 96, 101) thesis also reflected some of the polemics of the emerging 
modern configuration.  Referring to the reviewers of the General Theory Klein 
described Knight as one of “the mob in the stoning of the revolutionary dissenter” and 
Viner as someone who “did not agree with the theory of liquidity preference … He 
was not able to give up the quantity equation”.     
 
In “1923, as a faithful pupil of the classical school”, Keynes (1936, 334-5) argued that 
“the claim to cure Unemployment involves the Protectionist fallacy in its grossest and 
crudest form”.  But in the General Theory, Keynes (1936, 339, 341-4, 351) sought to 
unravel and undermine the “domination of the classical school” and to locate 
antecedents to his emphasis on money demand.  With fixed exchange rates, the 
interest rate could not be used to facilitate “full employment” and had been sacrificed 
“to the operation of blind forces”.  In contrast, mercantilists opposed high interest 
rates: “they were even aware that the rate of interest depended on liquidity-preference 
and the quantity of money”.  Between these two positions stood economists with 
varying degrees of confusion.  David Hume had “a foot and a half in the classical 
world”, while the “great” John Locke had managed to have “one foot in the 
mercantilist world and … one foot in the classical world”.  One of the defining 
characteristics of those who had (partially) escaped the “classical” nonsense was an 
understanding of liquidity preference.  Not only had Locke failed to proceed to “a 
genuine synthesis” but he was also “confused” and “overlooked altogether the 
possibility of fluctuations in liquidity preference” [emphasis in original].  As usual 
Keynes added some provocative spice to his analysis: “One recurs to the analogy 
between the sway of the classical school of economic theory and that of certain 
religions”.   
 
In the General Theory, Keynes (1936, 174, 194-5) explained that “the concept of 
Hoarding may be regarded as a first approximation to the concept of Liquidity-
preference”.  Liquidity preference was “substantially the same as that which has been 
sometimes discussed under the heading of the Demand for Money … In my Treatise 
on Money I studied the total demand for money under the headings of income-
deposits, business-deposits, and savings-deposits, and I need not repeat here the 
analysis which I gave in Chapter 3 of that book”.  Keynes (1936, 176, n3, 179) 
specifically associated Knight with a theory of interest which was “precisely in the 
traditional, classical mould”.  In Keynes’ judgement, Knight and the other “classical” 
theorists were guilty of propagating a “nonsense” and had failed to “furnish material 
for a theory of interest”.  When “we introduce the state of liquidity-preference and the 
quantity of money … then the whole position becomes determinate”.   
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Knight scribbled “Nonsense” and sometimes even stronger comments throughout his 
copy of the General Theory (Patinkin 1981, 289).  In his milder published review, 
Knight (chapter 50 [1937], 122, n22) objected to the tone of the General Theory: “it 
has become quite the fashion to account for differences in intellectual positions by 
psycho-analysing, or somehow ‘explaining’ one’s opponent (and the example of 
following the fashion having in this case been set by Mr Keynes)”.xix  In 1940, Knight 
opposed the award of an honorary degree to Keynes on the grounds that “His work 
and influence seem to me supremely ‘anti-intellectual’” in that he had sought to 
pander to the “prejudices” of “the man-in-the-street” (cited by Patinkin 1981, 301).   
 
As Harrod (1951, 409) pointed out, “the greater part of the doctrine of the General 
Theory on liquidity preference is to be found quite clearly set out in the Treatise”.  In 
the Treatise Keynes (1930, 249) discussed the motives for “the main variation in the 
total demand for money”.  In the Econometrica article which launched the IS-LM 
formalisation of the General Theory, Hicks (1937, 147) declared that that it was “the 
liquidity preference doctrine which is vital” in distinguishing the “classical” from the 
Keynesian equations: “Liquidity Preference transports us from the ‘Treasury View’ to 
the ‘General Theory of Employment’”.  Both Knight and Viner took exception to 
Keynes’ analysis of money demand: “His use of the term ‘liquidity’ to designate 
everything that makes it desirable to hold money … does not seem to be an advance 
or justifiable”.  Keynes’ assertion “that the rate of interest does, at any time, 
equilibrate the desirability of holding cash with the quantity of cash, is not only badly 
worded … but is definitely besides the point” (Knight chapter 50 [1937], 112).  Viner 
(chapter 48 [1936], 158-9; [1964], 258-263) complained about Keynes’ “gross 
oversimplification” of the issue.  However, the focus of Chicagoan opposition 
remained the General Theory not the Treatise. 
 
In ‘Some Notes on Liquidity Preference’, Kahn (1954, 250, 245) explained that 
Keynes never really escaped from the idea of a “stable” money demand relationship.  
Kahn sought to undermine Dennis Robertson’s attempt to put liquidity preference 
theory on stronger grounds by replacing the speculative motive for holding money.  
He was responding to Robertson’s (1946, 25) assertion that “the older Cambridge 
theory is kinder to ‘liquidity preference’ than is Mr Keynes” of the General Theory.  
Kahn concluded that “Sufficient has been said to demonstrate the unsuitability of 
thinking of a schedule of liquidity preference as though it could be represented by a 
well-defined curve or by a functional relationship expressed in mathematical terms or 
subject to econometric processes.  Keynes himself often gave way to the temptation to 
picture the state of liquidity preference as a fairly stable relationship, despite his 
intuitional horror of undue formalism, but his treatment at least can be justified by the 
need at the time for a forceful and clear-cut exposition if it was to carry any weight at 
all”.   
  
Kahn (1984, 171, 53, 51, 59, 137) heard Keynes lecturing from early drafts of 
Treatise and “found his lectures extremely puzzling, based, as they were, on the 
Quantity Theory.  (The great change occurred in the Summer Term of 1932)”.  Kahn 
complained that the Tract was “far more strictly monetarist than Marshall and Pigou”.  
But Keynes then “spent a considerable part of the next twelve years of his life in a 
struggle to escape from the stranglehold of the Quantity Theory”.  When the General 
Theory was published, “that was the end of the Quantity Theory until its recent 
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resuscitation.  Keynes in his long fight for release had conquered”.  In this battle for 
mental liberation the Treatise represented “an intermediate phase”.  Kahn reflected 
that “the origins of the liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest go back to 
Marshall … In a primitive, but extremely interesting form, the theory is to be found in 
a section of the Treatise”.xx 
 
Patinkin (chapter 45 [1975], 260; 1976, 7, 136, 45, 81) also described the Tract, the 
Treatise and the General Theory as Keynes’ interwar “trilogy … The Saga of Man’s 
Struggle for Freedom from the Quantity Theory”.  Keynes had inherited this quantity-
theory tradition “from his teachers at Cambridge”.  Patinkin cited the preface to the 
French edition of the General Theory in which Keynes stated that “the following 
analysis [of money and prices] registers my final escape from the confusions of the 
Quantity Theory, which once entangled me”.  Patinkin provided what he regarded as 
“conclusive evidence that a significant shift took place in Keynes’ views on the 
efficacy of monetary policy between the Treatise and the General Theory”.  In the 
Treatise there was “the unmistakable ring of the quantity theory” plus “the essence of 
the theory of liquidity preference”.   
 
In autumn 1932, Keynes delivered lectures at Cambridge on ‘The Monetary Theory of 
Production’ (Patinkin 1976, 72).xxi  In those lectures, Keynes (JMK XIII [1932], 397-
8) referred to “the state of liquidity-preference … which tells us what … the rate of 
interest exclusive of risk-allowance, will be, given to [the ?] quantity of money”.  
Keynes also discussed a fall in output “in accordance with the argument in my 
Treatise on Money.  Consequently the demand for money in the active circulation will 
fall, which in turn will affect the state of liquidity preference so that there will be a 
lowering cet. par. of the rate of interest corresponding to the given quantity of 
money” (Keynes cited by Patinkin 1980, 18).  Patinkin (1976, 72) commented that 
“The voice is that of the General Theory: but the analytical framework is still largely 
that of the Treatise”. 
 
Patinkin (1976, 33) explained that “One of the standard tasks with which every 
student of Keynes’ writings is confronted if that of tracing the intellectual relationship 
between the General Theory and the Treatise”.  Patinkin also noted that “economists 
who did their graduate training after the appearance of the General Theory – that is, 
the vast majority of professional economists today – are unlikely ever to have studied 
the Treatise systematically”.  As an historian, Patinkin qualified for this minority 
status.  As someone who did his graduate training between the Treatise and the 
General Theory, so too did Friedman.  
 
4.  1931: Keynes and the Chicago School 
Keynes spent a fortnight in Chicago (22 June-2 July 1931) attending the Harris 
Foundation lectures and seminars on “Unemployment as a World Problem” against 
the background of two parallel banking crises, in both Europe and in Chicago.  The 
1931 European financial crisis had started with the failure of the Credit Anstalt bank 
in Vienna on 11 May.  This financial contagion began to spread to Austria’s 
neighbours, including Germany.  From late May, the Reichbank began to suffer heavy 
losses of reserves.  On 20 June 1931, President Hoover proposed a two-year 
moratorium on war debts and reparation payments.  On 24 June 1931, the Reichbank 
obtained a central-bank credit of $100 million which temporarily calmed the markets.  
This “unexpected” development forced Karl Pribram (1931, 112, 118) from the 
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University of Frankfurt, to rewrite part of his Harris Foundation lecture.  With respect 
to unemployment, “the situation has nowhere reached such a critical state as in 
Germany.  And this reflection brings us back to the hopes of recovery attached to the 
execution of Mr Hoover’s relief action”.xxii  
 
Between December 1929 and the end of 1932, two thirds of banks in Chicago failed, a 
higher proportion than any other major US city (Phillips 1994, 17).  When Roosevelt 
received the Democratic nomination in Chicago in June 1932, the city was in the 
midst of a banking crisis: “great crowds gathered at the banks” (Hoover 1952, 170; 
Kennedy 1973, 40-42).  Keynes (JMK XX, 555-7, 571) was shocked by the banking 
crisis that he found upon his arrival in Chicago.  On the same day that he gave his first 
Harris Foundation lecture he wrote to Hubert Henderson: “Quite apart from the 
immediate situations, German or other, the effect on the situation here which I had 
most underestimated before I came was the position of many banks in the country … 
Owing to the number of banks which have actually failed there is great unrest among 
depositors.  There is a possibility at any moment of bank runs breaking out in 
different parts of the country, similar to what was lately experienced at Chicago.  The 
consequence is that depositors not infrequently take their money out in cash and keep 
it in a safe deposit box.  This has been particularly marked in recent weeks in the 
Chicago district, where safe deposit boxes are no longer obtainable.  Everyone agrees 
that there must be at least $400,000,00 to $500,000,000 being actually hoarded by the 
public in the shape of currency in boxes.  The same movement which has been 
occurring in Chicago might break out at any time in the Middle West if suspicions as 
to the position of the banks were to increase”.  On his return to Britain, Keynes 
reflected that “The Chicago situation is largely a reflection of a quite appalling real 
estate collapse from which it may take years to recover”.  
 
Keynes (1931a, 3, 4, 27, 35, 40, 16-7) began his Harris lecture in apocalyptic fashion: 
“We are today in the middle of the greatest economic catastrophe – the greatest 
catastrophe due almost entirely to economic causes – of the modern world.  I am told 
the view held in Moscow that this is the last, the culminating crisis of capitalism and 
that our existing order of society will not survive it”.  Keynes dissented from this 
pessimism: “I believe that our destiny is in our own hands and that we can emerge 
from it if only we choose - or rather if those choose who are in authority in the 
world”.  He explained that a “secure basis for a return to an equilibrium of prosperity” 
could only be achieved by increasing the volume of investment and allowing a revival 
of the price level.  He suggested that interest rates needed to be reduced via an 
increase in “the quantity of liquid assets” through open market operations which 
“involves technical questions of some difficulty with which I must not burden this 
lecture”.   
   
The United States (and presumably Chicago) in 1931 had a profound impact on 
Keynes (JMK XX [1931], 586): “Before I went to the United States I was disposed to 
hold with some confidence that the first impetus to recovery in the rest of the world 
would have to come from America.  I held this view so firmly that it was sometime 
before I even questioned it.  But eventually it was put to me point blank in discussion 
that perhaps the opposite was true.  And in the end I came to wonder whether this 
might not be the more probable opinion.  We may have to drag along what seems an 
endless period until something happens to stir the dry bones elsewhere then in North 
America”.xxiii   
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Keynes’ Harris lecture certainly made an impression on J. Laurence Laughlin, the 
founding chairman of the Chicago economics department and the founding editor of 
the JPE (1892-5).  In The Federal Reserve Act its Origin and Problems, Laughlin 
(1933, 222, 229, 231-2) abused the quantity theory, Fisher and his “unquestionable 
error … the American inflationist school of Irving Fisher has called in for 
reinforcement … John Maynard Keynes”.  Keynes’ “remarks on the abandonment of 
the British gold standard and the sacerdotal nature assigned to the influence of the 
quantity of money on prices are scarcely credible”.  Presumably referring to the Harris 
lectures, Laughlin continued: “Coming to this country [Keynes] was, of course, given 
a hearing in magazines and as a speaker, but his method of going off into difficult 
ground, where it was hard for the untrained mass to follow kept him from making 
much of an impression.  On the gold standard and its substitution by sterling, he could 
not easily be followed … Such exposition sounds most like the theorising taken from 
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland.  It would seem as if Keynes in this process has 
stepped off the firmer earth into the violent instability of dreams.  It is too fantastic to 
be taken seriously”. 
 
But Patinkin (chapter 46 [1981/1979], 293-4) asserted that the Harris lectures 
“apparently did not bring [Keynes] into contact with the Chicago School … Henry 
Simons (who was then an assistant professor) did participate in several of the round 
tables, but he too did so actively only once and inconsequentially (Reports, p. 88).  
Only Lloyd Mints (then also an assistant professor) played a more active role”.  Given 
the pivotal importance of Mints’ Economics 330 in the dispute over Chicago oral 
tradition this seems a surprising assertion.  Virtually all of the Chicago economists 
were listed as members of the 1931 roundtable group, including Garfield Cox, Aaron 
Director, Harry Gideonse, Frank Knight, Harry Millis, Samuel Nerlove, Henry 
Schultz, Chester Wright, Quincy Wright and Theodore Yntema (Davis 1971, 
appendix B).  The evidence suggests that the Harris lectures unambiguously brought 
the Chicago School into contact with Keynes, oral traditions and the quantity theory-
money demand nexus.  
 
Simons contributed to the session led by Hansen (24th June) on ‘Business Cycles, 
Price Levels and Unemployment’.  Hansen (1931, 59-60) argued that “one of the 
things that tends to prolong the depression at the present time as against earlier 
periods is the fact that takes a longer time to reach a readjustment in the internal price 
structure, because our price and wage systems are becoming increasingly rigid.  That 
means there is a longer lag, a longer time before you reach a new equilibrium in the 
internal price structure, which I think is a fundamental condition for an increase in the 
rate of investment”.  Hansen (1931, 62) dissented from the analysis provided by the 
Treatise: “It seems to me that the maladjustment between the rate investment and the 
rate of savings, which Mr Keynes discusses so clearly in his book, is fundamentally to 
be found not on the saving side, but on the investment side”.  The proposal to increase 
wages, Hansen (1931, 64-5) argued “invert[ed] cause and effect … this thesis entirely 
overlooks all the fundamental principles which I am not willing to abandon, that we 
have had worked out through a long development of economic theory of the relation 
of money and prices, a theory, in other words, of the value of money.  You cannot 
control the price level by raising the price of one agent of production.  That, in a 
nutshell, is the point”. 
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Keynes (1931a, 73-4) responded: “I find it very difficult to discuss this question 
without making a distinction between the level of prices and the level of costs … The 
quantity theory, I think, is essentially an equilibrium theory.  When the two are in 
adjustment, when costs and prices are adapted to one another, the level of the two of 
them depends on the quantity of money”.   
 
Keynes (JMK XX [1931], 580) later reflected that at the Chicago conference the 
majority opinion favoured the view that the wage-price nexus operated in reverse: “I 
heard the question of the advisability of wage reductions discussed in a large 
gathering of academic economists.  The voice of the ‘equilibriumists’ … was heard, 
but I think it would be true to say that the balance of opinion was decidedly in favour 
of the view that the immediate advantages to employment from wage reductions 
would not be large and were outweighed by other considerations (social and the effect 
on the price level in relation to monetary indebtedness)”.   
 
Lewis Lorwin (1931, 84) asked Keynes about his preference for an “indirect” solution 
to unemployment by manipulating the interest rate as opposed to more “direct” 
methods.  Keynes (1931a, 84) replied: “I use that because I am speaking in the 
country which is the last home of individualism”.  Wright, Director, Cox, Simons and 
Mints all took part in the subsequent discussion.  Keynes (1931a, 92) thought that this 
discussion “brings us back to the question asked about individualism, whether private 
capitalism is capable of solving the problem completely.  I do not feel at all certain.”  
Referring to the idea that “the conditions which lead to prosperity have within them 
the seeds of depression … so long as you have as a guiding force the desire for 
profit”, Wright (1931b, 93) asked Keynes “whether at least that degree of inevitability 
is inherent?”  Keynes (1931a, 93) responded: “I should agree that the capitalistic 
society as we now run it is essentially unstable.  The question in my mind is whether 
one could preserve the stability by the injection of a moderate degree of management; 
whether in practice it is beyond our power to do this, and that we will have to have 
some further plan of control.  I should like to try the central bank method first, 
uncertain how far in practice it would lead us.  If that proved to be incapable of 
keeping things reasonably steady, but I should go in for a very great degree of state 
control of the rate of investment”.   
   
As a result of this questioning, Keynes (1931a, 94) outlined two aspects of the 
philosophy to which Simons and the “rules party” objected.  Keynes advocated 
discretionary macroeconomic management to “keep the price index and the 
employment index steady”.  Hansen (1931, 94) asked whether it was not the case that 
“in our present state of knowledge we have no guide at all dependable, and 
consequently the system you propose is a purely Utopia one?”   
 
Keynes (1931a, 94) defended himself by explaining that “statistics are becoming more 
adequate … I think we economists have given the practical business men very little 
real help in the past.  If they were aided by more complete statistical data, then I think 
we should find central banks doing their best duty”.  When asked by Hansen (1931, 
94) about the reliability of the “judgment” of the central bankers, Keynes (1931a, 94) 
replied: “I think we already know enough to give them general suggestions … Painful 
experience works wonders.  It is really the economists who are primarily at fault.  We 
have never given any sort of scientific conclusions, such as you would expect.  So 
long as the supposedly experts fail to agree among themselves, it seems to me 
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reasonable for the practical business men to pay only moderate attention to them”.  
Magnusson (1931, 96) asked him: “Must we not be very careful in our use of the 
word ‘scientists’?  Are we justified in really flirting with the word?”  In reply, Keynes 
(1931a, 96) explained that “Ours is a very complex science.  It possesses the subject 
matter of science”.   
  
5. 1931: Keynes and Mints 
In the June 23rd seminar on ‘Public Works Construction and Unemployment’, Keynes 
(1931a, 303) stated that he thought “the argument for public works in this country is 
much weaker than it is in Great Britain.  In Great Britain I have for a long time past 
agitated very strongly for a public works program, and my argument has been that we 
are such a centre of an international system that we cannot operate on the rate of 
interest … In this country you haven’t a problem of that kind.  Here you can function 
as though you were a closed system … For such a system I would use as my first 
method operating on the long term rate of interest … I think in this country deliberate 
public works should be regarded much more as a tonic to change the state of business 
conditions, but the means of getting back to the state of equilibrium should be 
concentrated on the rate of interest”.    
 
Mints had an extensive exchange with Keynes during the Harris Foundation seminars.  
Keynes led the discussion on ‘Is it possible for Governments and Central Banks to do 
Anything on Purpose to Remedy Unemployment?’  Chairman Quincy Wright (1931b, 
461) invited the audience “to take up the cudgels with Mr Keynes”.  Mints (1931, 
479) asked Keynes: “Your means of reducing a long-term rate of interest has been an 
indirect means.  I wonder what you would say to a more direct means, namely 
purchasing industrial and public utility bonds by the member banks themselves”.   
 
Mints did not receive a satisfactory reply.  Later, Keynes (1931a, 493) stated that “the 
forces of supply are the savings of the community: the forces of demand are the 
amount of construction that will take place at different rates of interest, and I want to 
fix the rate of interest at the point where the supply and demand meet”.  Mints (1931, 
493-4) pressed Keynes again: “I should like to revert for a moment to the question of 
the relative importance of lowering the interest rate and public works.  As I 
understand your argument, you want to reduce the interest rate in order to bring about 
equivalence between saving and investment.  As a matter of fact, won’t public works 
bring about precisely the same results, not through decreasing the rate of interest, but 
increasing the rate of return for business firms, thereby increasing the rate of 
investment, even at current rates of interest?”     
 
Keynes (1931a, 494) replied: “Certainly; therefore I am in favour of an admixture of 
public works, but my feeling is that unless you socialise the country to a degree that is 
unlikely, you will get to the end of the public works programme, if not in one year, in 
two years, and therefore if you’re not prepared to reduce the rate of interest and bring 
back private enterprise, when you get to the end of the public works programme you 
have shot your bolt, and you are no better off.  I should use the public works 
programme to fill in the interregnum while I was getting the interest down.  The 
public works program would in itself increase business profits, and therefore relieve 
people from that exceptional unwillingness to borrow.  I should be afraid of that as a 
sole remedy.  I should be afraid it would work itself out, come to an end, and then we 
should be back where we were unless we decided on a very definite further action”.  
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According to Kahn (1974, 368-9), Keynes had previously been “curiously 
conventional for a genius”.  Influenced by Kahn’s (1931, 1933) multiplier articles, 
Keynes gradually began to embrace a position much closer to that espoused in 1931 
by Mints.  By 1951, it appears that Mints’ pre-General Theory advocacy of public 
works had undergone a transformation.  Dennis Robertson (1951, 466-7), in a review 
of Mints’ (1950) Monetary Policy for a Competitive Society suggested that Mints’ 
opposition to public works looked as if it was “tinged with fanaticism”.  
  
Samuelson (1996, 149-150, 154-5) may have witnessed part of this transformation 
during his undergraduate years at Chicago (1932-5).  He was taught undergraduate 
monetary economics by Mints using Robertson’s Money and another text from which 
he “was taught MV=PQ”.  When, in 1935, he was considering whether to go to 
Harvard graduate school he was “warned by Lloyd Mints that Seymour Harris in 
macroeconomics was an inflationist … Mints must have had some keen sense of 
smell, because after Harris did get tenure he became a flaming Keynesian”.xxiv   
 
But in Chicago, Keynes (1931a, 27, 35, 40, 16-7) explained that a “secure basis for a 
return to an equilibrium of prosperity” could only be achieved by increasing volume 
of investment and allowing a revival of the price level.  Keynes suggested that interest 
rates needed to be reduced via an increase in “the quantity of liquid assets” through 
open market operations which “involves technical questions of some difficulty with 
which I must not burden this lecture”.  Keynes explained that he was limited by “the 
medium of oral exposition” adding that “Those who may wish to pursue the matter 
further I must refer to my Treatise on Money”.  There is common agreement that in 
June 1931, Keynes essentially repeated the analysis contained in the Treatise 
(Patinkin 1976, 68; Moggridge 1992, 518; Skidelsky 1992, 391; Dimand 1988, 143-4; 
Klein 1950b, 35).   
 
Lorie Tarshis (1996, 55) recalled that on 10th October 1932, Keynes arrived for the 
first lecture of a course that had been scheduled as ‘The Theory of Money and Prices’; 
but announced that the lecture series had a new title: ‘The Monetary Theory of 
Production’, a change that Keynes declared was “significant”.  Tarshis reflected that 
this was “the opening bugle of the Keynesian revolution”.  In October 1932, before 
the modern configuration had fully emerged, Friedman scribbled on his 330 
bibliography: “Look up Keynes’ lectures for Harris Foundation on reserve at E11 
under Q. Wright’s name”.  Friedman, like other attentive 330 graduate students, 
presumably wrote these words in at Mints’ suggestion.  
 
6. 1932-3: Mints and Friedman 
 
6.1 Economics 330 Course Outline 
There are in effect two relevant Economics 330 bibliographies in the Friedman 
archives.xxv  The first is the version that Mints presumably circulated in the first class 
of the course and the second is the version that Mints actually used for the course 
(which consists of the first plus Friedman’s handwritten additions).  
 
The only two items in the first bibliography that are added to in the second relate to 
Irving Fisher’s Purchasing Power of Money and Keynes’ Treatise.  With respect to 
the first, Friedman (to Patinkin 19 July 1972) recalled “that Mints paid a great deal of 
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attention to Irving Fisher’s work and in particular to the book on the Purchasing 
Power of Money in the monetary course that I remember taking from him.  Certainly I 
recall when I left Chicago after being a graduate student there in the period from 1932 
to 1935, I left with a definite opinion that Fisher was one of the great men of the time 
and one of the great contributors to monetary analysis.  Perhaps I got that somewhere 
else, but I think I got it in large measure from Mints’ course”.xxvi  Since Mints 
informed Patinkin (1981, 285) that “I have always had the greatest respect for Irving 
Fisher” Friedman’s recollection appears to be justified. 
 
Amongst the 19 items on the second section of the first bibliography were “Fisher, 
Purchasing Power of Money, chs. 2-5” which Friedman corrected by hand to read “2-
5 + 8”.  Chapters 2-5 largely outlined the equation of exchange.  The purpose of 
chapter 8 (“Influence of quantity of money and other factors on purchasing power and 
on each other”) was “to set forth the causes determining the purchasing power of 
money … It is proposed in this chapter to inquire how far these propositions are really 
causal propositions” [Fisher’s emphasis].  The chapter concluded that “we find 
nothing to interfere with the truth of the quantity theory that variations in money (M) 
produce normally proportional changes in prices” (Fisher 1922 [1911], 149, 151, 
183).xxvii  
 
Patinkin (chapter 5 [1969/1981], 245, 250) concluded that the Chicago quantity 
theory was “first and foremost, not a theory of the demand for money, but a theory 
which relates the quantity of money (M) to the aggregate demand for goods and 
services (MV), and thence to the price level (P) and/or level of output (T); all this in 
accordance with Fisher’s MV=PT”.  According to Patinkin’s notes from Mints’ 1944 
lectures: “Mints prefers following statement of quantity theory: P is the dependent 
variable (in the long-run) of the equation MV=PT.  But in the short run all variables 
tend to move together”.       
 
At one level, the structure of the 1932 version of 330 appears to support Patinkin’s 
account.  According to the course outline there were three sections.  The first section 
was devoted to “The functions of money and banking (a) the origins of money; (b) the 
functions of money (c) the functions of banking”; the second to “Statement of theories 
concerning the relation of money and banking to the price level”; and the third to 
“Appraisal of these theories by means of (a) logical analysis; (b) examination of the 
process of changes in the price level”. 
 
At a deeper level, the evidence supports Friedman’s memory.  In the first 
bibliography there are two entries for “Keynes, Monetary Reform”: the first under 
section II, “Statement of theories concerning the relation of money and banking to the 
price level” (“pages 81-95”) and the second under “Some general references on the 
theory of international prices” (“pp. 95-116”).  Both entries come from chapter 3 
(‘The theory of money and of the foreign exchanges’). 
 
Keynes had been teaching the material contained in chapter 3 of the Tract on 
Monetary Reform at Cambridge since 1911 (Skidelsky 1992, 153; 1983, 214-21; 
Moggridge 1992, 197-200).  In that year, Keynes (JMK 1983, 11 [1911], 375-76) in his 
review of Fisher’s Purchasing Power of Money stated that “the theory of money, as it 
has ordinarily been understood and taught by academic economists in England for some 
time past, is considerably in advance of any published account of it.  It is hardly an 
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exaggeration to say that monetary theory, in its most accurate form, has become in 
England a matter of oral tradition.  These preliminary remarks are necessary in order to 
explain that it is from the standpoint of this oral tradition, rather than from that of any 
printed book, that an English economist must approach Professor Fisher’s very 
important contribution to the subject”. 
 
Chapter 3 of Monetary Reform began with the statement that “The quantity theory of 
money … is fundamental.  Its correspondence with fact is not open to question”.  
Keynes (1923, 74, 84-6, 95-116) explained that the supply of money was “under the 
direct control (or ought to be) of the central banking authorities” but that the public’s 
holding of cash and deposits was “not directly controllable, and depends on the mood 
of the public and the business world”.  Keynes then argued that “Cyclical 
fluctuations” were characterised primarily by changes in the latter and not the former.  
Stabilising the price level, Keynes argued, required the authorities to vary the money 
supply so as to “counterbalance” the movements of money demand. 
 
6.2 Friedman’s Readings, 330 Lecture Notes and Examination Paper 
At the end of the course, Mints required his students to answer four examination 
questions from a total of five.   The first two were invitations to critically examine 
statements made by Frederick Hayek and Ralph Hawtrey (the second relating to 
Fisher’s equation of exchange).  The third was an invitation to examine the ceteris 
paribus assumption of the quantity theory.  Question 4a was: “Discuss the relation 
between the k of Keynes’ earlier equation and the velocity of circulation”.  4b was 
“Discuss the statement that changes in the velocity of circulation of goods cannot 
bring about changes in the price level because of the fact that they necessarily bring 
about compensating changes in the velocity of circulation of money”.  Question 5 was 
“According to Keynes’ analysis what would it be necessary to do in order to eliminate 
the business cycle?  State and support your opinion of Keynes’ conclusion”.   
 
Milton and Rose Friedman both took this examination, which was scheduled 
immediately following Viner’s examination.   Rose Friedman recalled that Viner was 
“an extreme disciplinarian in the classroom.  Some students found the course 
forbidding and lived in fear of the man and of his subject.  I found the course 
stimulating but the man forbidding, in part because the tales I had heard as an 
undergraduate about how tough he was.  The gossip was that he failed at least a third 
of the class every year”.  Because her brother, Aaron Director, was on the faculty she 
“was nervous about embarrassing him by not making the grade … I was so nervous at 
the end of Viner’s exam that I could not read the questions in Mints’s exam”.  When 
Mints saw her paralysed in his examination room “he came over and asked what was 
wrong.  I explained my problem.  In a very fatherly way, he said, ‘Just relax for a few 
minutes and you’ll be fine’.  But that didn’t happen.  When Mints came around a 
second time when I was in no better mental condition, his answer was, ‘You can write 
a paper on Keynes’s Treatise on Money instead’” (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 35, 
38).  This could only be interpreted as an act of kindness if the Treatise was such a 
prominent component of the course as to be easily accessible even to a student 
suffering from Viner-paralysis.   
 
Not only were the last required words of the course about Keynes, but also the first 
words that Friedman wrote in his notes were “Econ 330 Keynes”.  Mints concluded 
that: “General Framework of Keynes likely to endure much longer than details. 1. 
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Equality of Investment + Savings.  Is this idea something entirely new?  Mints says 
no”.  The evidence suggests that in autumn 1932 Mints allocated more attention to the 
Treatise than he had intended to.  The Treatise appeared as item 18 in the original 
bibliography under section II with the required readings listed as “Vol I, chs. 9-12 and 
14”.  Friedman underlined the whole of item 18 and crossed out the original chapters 
and replaced the entry with “chs. 9-19”.  Under section IIIa. Friedman added “Keynes 
Treatise vol I Pages 53-120 (part. 53-88), also 221-239”.  Friedman initially took 
thirty pages of notes from chapters 9-19 of the Treatise, and then took an additional 
fifty-one pages of detailed notes from volume one and six pages of notes from volume 
two.   
 
Chapter 19 of the Treatise began with the observation that “The experience of 
postwar period led many of us to advocate stability of the price level as the best 
possible objective of practical policy.  Amongst other things, this would mean an 
attempt on the part of the banking authorities to eliminate the credit cycle at all costs”.  
Chapter 10 (‘The Fundamental Equations for the Value of Money’) began with the 
observation that “The Fundamental Problem of Monetary Theory is … to treat the 
problem dynamically, analysing the different elements involved, in such a manner as 
to exhibit the causal process by which the price level is determined, and a method of 
transition from one period of equilibrium to another.  The forms of the Quantity 
Theory, however, on which we have all been brought up – I shall give an account of 
them in detail in Chapter 14 – are but ill adapted for this purpose” (Keynes 1930, 293, 
133).       
 
Chapter 14 was devoted to ‘Alternative Forms of the Fundamental Equation’.  Section 
1, outlining ‘The “Real Balances” Quantity Equation’, almost perfectly capture 
Friedman’s (chapter 2 [1956], 3-4) description of the Chicago oral tradition in which 
it was vitally important to explain “why people are willing to hold the particular 
nominal quantity of money in existence … The quantity theory is in the first instance 
a theory of the demand for money”.  In section 2 of chapter 14 (‘The “Cambridge” 
Quantity Equation’), Keynes (1930, 229) explained that he was doing little more than 
capturing a Cambridge oral tradition: “The ‘Real-balances’ Equation discussed above 
is descended from a method of approach long familiar to those who have heard 
Professors Marshall and Pigou in the lecture-rooms of Cambridge”.xxviii  It appears 
that chapter 14 made a special impression on Friedman.  Under his notes entitled “1. 
‘Real-Balances’ Quantity Equation” Friedman provided what appears to be the only 
cross-reference in these fifty-seven pages: “[see notes on Monetary Reform]”.   
 
Keynes (1924, 336) explained that Alfred Marshall’s “main ideas became known to 
pupils in a general way, with the result that there grew up at Cambridge an oral 
tradition, first from Marshall’s own lectures and since his retirement from those of 
Professor Pigou, different from, and (I think it may be claimed) superior to, anything 
that could be found in printed books until recently”.  Keynes then added a footnote: 
“Professor Irving Fisher being the first, in several instances, to publish in book-form 
ideas analogous to those which had been worked out by Marshall at much earlier 
dates”. 
 
Keynes (1924, 338) summarised the Marshallian approach to money as reflected in 
Money Credit and Commerce: “Marshall also expounded long ago the way in which 
distrust of a currency raises prices by diminishing the willingness of the public to hold 
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stocks of it – a phenomenon to which recent events have now called everyone’s 
attention; and he was aware that the fluctuation in the price level, which is an 
accompaniment of the trade cycle, corresponds to a fluctuation in the volume of 
‘ready command’ which the public desire to hold”.  After ‘ready command’ Keynes 
added a footnote: “This is Marshall’s phrase for what I have called ‘real balances’”.   
 
In 1932, Mints required his 330 students to read Marshall’s Money Credit and 
Commerce and Friedman took two pages of notes from chapter IV, ‘Total Value of 
the Currency Needed by a Country’.  Friedman wrote: “Function of Currency. A. 
Money demand not for own sake but its possession gives ready command of general 
purchasing power in a convenient form … Total value of a country’s currency, 
multiplied into the average no. of times of its changing hands for business purposes 
each year, is of course = to the total amount of business transacted in that country by 
direct payment of currency in that year.  But this identity statement does not indicate 
the causes that govern the rapidity of circulation of currency: to discover that we must 
look to amount of purchasing power which the people of that country elect to keep in 
form of currency”.       
 
In his 330 bibliography, Friedman wrote “read” underlined four times alongside 
“Hansen Business Cycle Theory, chs. 1 and 6” and took thirty pages of notes from 
that book.  Hansen (1927, iv, 3, 7) explained that his purpose was to enable the 
student “to cut a path through the tangled mass of apparently contradictory 
explanations of the business cycle”.  In Chapter 1 (‘A Classification of Business 
Cycle Theories’) Hansen identified “three broad type of business cycle theories”.  The 
first two types believed that the business cycle was a “function of the capitalist 
economy”; the first seeking remedies through redistributing income in a more 
egalitarian fashion; the second focusing attention on the inherent nature of 
technology.  The third type of explanation saw the business cycle as “a function of the 
money economy”.   
 
In Chapter 6 (‘The Money Economy as a Cause of the Business Cycle’), Hansen 
(1927, 139, 143-4) explained that Hawtrey’s “theory of the business cycle may be 
said to be the culmination of the line of analysis which we have been tracing”.  The 
central element of this type of theory was that “It is the flow [Hansen’s emphasis] of 
purchasing power that is important, not the outstanding aggregate of money units.  
The ‘unspent margin’ in terms of money units, is made up of the money in circulation 
and the bank credit outstanding … Hawtrey’s ‘command over wealth which the 
people hold in reserve’ appears to be similar to J. M. Keynes’s ‘volume of real 
balances … [which] may fluctuate violently even though there is little change in the 
volume of cash or in the reserve policy of the banks”.  Hansen (1927, 144) proposed 
that this Hawtrey-Keynes type of theory be called “deflations and inflations of real 
balances”. 
 
In 1932, Mints also prescribed “Pigou, The Value of Money, in the Quarterly Journal 
of Economics for 1917-18, pp. 38-65”.  Two decades later Mints coedited an AEA 
volume of Readings in Monetary Theory in which Pigou’s essay was reprinted (Lutz 
and Mints 1952). In the 1950s Friedman presumably had an opportunity to reread 
Pigou’s article since he recommended the Lutz-Mints volume to his students 
(Hammond 1999).  Pigou (1952 [1917-8], 163, 183, 173-4) explained that he was “not 
in any sense an ‘opponent’ of the quantity theory or a hostile critic of Professor 
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Fisher’s lucid analysis”.  But to “tackle” the problems associated with the value of 
money “without tools is like going into a modern battle unhelmeted and unarmed.  
The ‘quantity theory’ furnishes a tool which in the skilled hands of Professor Irving 
Fisher has accomplished great things.  But less experienced craftsmen need, I think, a 
better – a more completely fool-proof tool.  It is this that, in the preceding pages, I 
have endeavoured to provide”.   
 
The bulk of Pigou’s article was devoted to the demand for money, its supply and the 
interaction between the two.  Having derived “the demand schedule for money … the 
dry bones of my equation of demand” Pigou explained that “it remains to explain the 
relation in which that equation stands to the ‘equation of exchange’ made familiar in 
the ‘quantity theory’ – an equation, by the way, which would itself be more properly 
described as an equation of demand”. Pigou claimed that the money demand 
formulation of the quantity theory was “a somewhat more effective engine of analysis 
… I offer this specification of it in order that those interested in monetary theory may 
test its powers in actual work upon concrete problems”.        
 
In 1932, Mints also prescribed “Robertson, Money, revised edition, chs. 2, 3 and 4”.  
Two thirds of a century later it remained, in Friedman’s judgement, “one of the most 
lucid and profound presentations of the central principles of monetary theory” 
(Friedman and Friedman 1998, 247).  In contrast, Samuelson (1996, 148-9) used 
Robertson’s Money to support Patinkin’s assault on Friedman.xxix  However, in 
chapter 2 on “The Value of Money” Robertson (1928, 39, 30, 37) explained that he 
was describing “the underlying psychological forces determining the value of money 
… given the conditions of demand for money, its value depends on the quantity of it 
available”.  The “truth” of the matter was that “in estimating the demand for money 
we must take into account not only the volume of goods to be disposed of within a 
given time, but also the frequency with which each of them changes hands … the 
magnitude of the demand for money, like that of the demand for bread, turns out to be 
the result of a process of individual weighing-up of competing advantages at the 
margin” [Robertson’s emphases].xxx   
 
Patinkin’s (chapter 5 [1969/1981], 255) “main point” was that Friedman (chapter 2 
[1956]) presented “an elegant and sophisticated statement of modern Keynesian theory 
… whose analytical structure as it now exists stems from the publication during the 
1930s of Keynes’ Treatise on Money (vol 1, pp140-46)” plus Hicks (1935, 13-32) and 
Keynes (1936, 166-72, 22-9).  But years before the General Theory, Keynes (1924, 
337) stressed that this marginal portfolio analysis of an individual’s demand for 
money was part of the Marshallian heritage.  Hicks (1935, 3) also emphasised that in 
the Treatise, Keynes had “put substance” into the analysis of “choice at the margin … 
by his doctrine that the relative preference depends upon the ‘bearishness’ or 
‘bullishness’ of the public, upon their relative desire for liquidity or profit”.  This was 
“the most important part of his theoretical contribution”.   
 
Thus Patinkin (chapter 5 1969/1981], 242, 255) argued that Friedman’s (chapter 2 
[1956]) supposed “reformulation” of the quantity theory was “a misleading 
designation” because “what Friedman has actually presented is an elegant exposition 
of the modern portfolio approach to the demand for money which, though it has some 
well-known (albeit largely undeveloped) antecedents in the traditional theory, can 
only be seen as a continuation of the Keynesian theory of liquidity preference”.  
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Friedman (chapter 2 [1956]) was “in direct continuation of this intellectual line of 
descent”.  Yet Patinkin included the Treatise in this lineage.   
 
6.3 Reviews of the Treatise  
On the back of his 330 bibliography Friedman wrote a list of reviews of the Treatise 
which included the Keynes-Robertson and Keynes-Hayek exchanges, plus reviews 
from Pigou, Hawtrey, Williams, Josiah Stamp and Charles Hardy.  Mints recalled that 
in the 1930s, he, Simons, Knight and probably Director met weekly at Hardy’s home. 
Samuel Nerlove observed that Hardy exerted an “exceedingly significant” influence 
on both Mints and Simons, having taught the latter (cited by Patinkin 1981, 284-5).  
Homer Jones (9 October 1962) wrote to Margaret Porter that during his time at 
Chicago in 1933-4 “Hardy’s book on the Federal Reserve System was regarded as the 
best critique of the policies and actions of that central bank”.  Hardy was also an early 
critic of the New Deal, which he described as an attempt to “substitute centralised 
authority of one sort or another for what is left of free competitive enterprise” (cited 
by Saunders 1966, 54).  These libertarian credentials were later reflected in Hardy’s 
appointment as the founding treasurer of the Mont Pelerin Society (Hartwell 1995, 
45).  Friedman (chapter 7 [1972/1974], 164, n19) appears to be justified in describing 
Hardy as a Chicagoan “at one remove”.   
 
In the first part of his review, Hardy (1931a, 150-2) predicted that Keynes’ work 
would be the most influential book published since the war and would “profoundly” 
modify the “serious work of the next generation on business cycles, central banking, 
and international finance”.  In the second part, Hardy (1931b, 394) argued that 
Keynes’ analysis should be “supplemented by Professor Fisher’s well-known theory 
as to the relation between the rate of interest and the anticipated depreciation or 
appreciation in the value of money … Keynes’ rejection of Fisher’s doctrine on this 
point (II, 202) reflects such a complete and obvious misunderstanding of the whole 
point that they can hardly be other than a lapsus calami”.    
 
Robertson’s (1931, 409-410) review was highly critical of several aspects of the 
Treatise.  But he also concluded that “I have no doubt that Mr Keynes is right in 
laying stress on hoarding as a dominant feature of trade depression.  In this respect I 
feel sure his work is of high significance … Where I suspect there is still work to be 
done is in clearing up the nature of the forces which lead the spirit of hoarding down”.  
Keynes (1930, 138) had previously explained that his fundamental equations 
“resemble all other versions of the Quantity Theory”.  In his reply to Robertson, 
Keynes (1931b, 419) made it clear that he was moving still further in the direction of 
focusing on the demand for money within this quantity theory framework: “I should 
like to repeat that the amount of the hoards of the public is as much outside their 
control as is the quantity of money, and for the same reasons … This is why it is so 
important to distinguish the forces determining the quantity of hoards (which is the 
affair of the banker) from the forces determining the propensity to hoard (which is the 
affair of the public).  The old quantity equations did not reveal this to me …”.  
 
The first part of Hayek’s review provoked Keynes (JMK XIII [1931], 243-266) both 
privately and publicly.  As Patinkin (1976, 58) pointed out, “as a result of these 
foregoing criticisms” Keynes was jolted further down the path towards the General 
Theory.  But Hayek (1932, 34-5) made clear in the second part of his review that 
Keynes’ discussion of hoarding was “the most interesting aspect of his theoretical 
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analysis … there is no doubt that he is here breaking new ground and that he is 
opening up new vistas … the practical importance of this phenomenon is much 
greater than most economists used to suppose”.   
 
Friedman found at Chicago a “vibrant intellectual atmosphere of a kind that I had 
never dreamed existed” (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 35).  The excitement 
associated with his monetary education must have been intensified both by spatial 
proximity to the Great Depression and by temporal proximity to these debates: the 
second part of Hayek’s review was published February 1932, eight months before the 
start of Economics 330.xxxi    
 
7. 1968-74: Friedman’s Defence 
Patinkin and Stanley Fischer worked on ‘The Chicago Tradition, the Quantity Theory, 
and Friedman’ in the year following Friedman’s AEA presidential address.  Upon 
receiving a draft from Patinkin, Friedman (5 December 1968) replied that: “I continue 
to regard what I wrote as a reformulation of the quantity theory of money, just as I 
continue to regard Keynes’ Monetary Reform, and large parts of his Treatise, and 
some parts of his Gen. Theory, as the writings of a quantity theorist … I would argue 
that much of K’s analysis of liquidity preference is a carry-over from his earlier 
quantity theory orientation and only the absolute liquidity preference element as truly 
Keynesian”.xxxii   
 
Friedman offered the same defence at a social gathering on 16 March 1971, attended 
by Homer Jones, Gary Becker, David Meiselman, Robert Gordon and Fischer. That 
night Fischer wrote to Patinkin describing what had transpired: “The major points 
which Milton made is that there is nothing particularly Keynesian about the liquidity 
preference function, and that the demand for money sections of the General Theory 
are simply a slightly inferior version of Keynes’ views in the Tract.  In response to 
arguments that the interest rate and rate of inflation were to be found as arguments in 
the velocity function only in Lavington and Pigou (or most explicitly in those two 
authors) he pulled the Tract off the shelves and with the aid of Gary Becker found 
some parts under the chapter on ‘Inflation as a Tax’ which were quite suggestive.  
Anyway, Milton argues that there is nothing inconsistent in having a demand-for-
money function similar to that of the General Theory and being a quantity theorist, 
quoting as evidence Keynes of the Tract who claimed that there was no disputing the 
quantity theory”.xxxiii     
 
Friedman (chapter 7 [1972/1974], 171) subsequently cited the chapter on ‘Inflation as 
a Method of Taxation’ in his response to Patinkin.  In correspondence, Friedman (5 
December 1968) told Patinkin that “I find your description of the oral tradition 
entirely acceptable and much better and more comprehensive than mine.  In 
extenuation, I can only say that the 1956 essay did not set out to be an essay in history 
of thought but an introduction to a collection of studies.  Unquestionably, however, 
had I had your paper before me when I wrote that paper, I would have written the first 
part of it differently”.xxxiv  Fischer (16 March 1971) reported to Patinkin that Friedman 
“said that there was only one thing to which he seriously objected – and that was the 
implication that he had made up the ‘Chicago tradition (oral)’ out of whole cloth”.xxxv 
 
Fischer continued: “When pressed on the point of the instability of velocity 
emphasised in Simons and Mints, Milton agreed to Simons, but was more hesitant 
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about Mints.  Both Becker and Meiselman said that Mints of the early 50’s did not 
believe that velocity was unstable, and Homer Jones said that Mints of the late 20’s 
also emphasises the stability of velocity … Milton was fairly careful: he seemed to 
argue that the only statements about the oral tradition which are to be taken seriously 
are those at the beginning of the article, before he begins to number points.  Thus he 
would say that the oral tradition essentially was the approach that money matters, and 
little more”.xxxvi    
 
Friedman (1912-) was only a decade older than Patinkin (1922-95); but when the 
1972 JPE symposium appeared (Gordon 1974), four decades had elapsed since he 
attended Mints’ Economics 330.  In contrast, Patinkin was in his mid-40s when he 
became so agitated by what he perceived to be the conflict between his own memory 
and Friedman’s introductory essay.  He was in his mid-30s when he first noted and 
commented (in correspondence and in conversation) on the discrepancy.  As a 
younger man in his prime, Patinkin was confident in the accuracy of his own 
recollections and stated that Friedman’s account “strikes no response chord in my 
memory” (Patinkin chapter 6 [1969/1981], 242).  Friedman (to Patinkin 5 December 
1968) was left wondering whether “I can trust my retrospective memory”.xxxvii   
 
Perhaps Friedman was taken aback by the vehemence of the attack by someone he 
regarded as a friend.  In addition, Patinkin was an historian of economic thought; 
Friedman was not.  Indeed, Friedman (12 July 1951) described himself to Lionel 
Robbins as “a tyro in the history of thought”.xxxviii  Besides, the JPE symposium was 
A Debate with His Critics (plural).  Fischer (16 March 1971) reported to Patinkin that 
Friedman indulged in “some minor grumbling about not having the time to be 
involved in polemics”.xxxix  This may explain why he did not examine his 330 lecture 
notes or course outline.  More importantly, in the early 1970s Friedman was entering 
his period of peak influence: ‘The Transition from Fixed Exchange Rates to Money 
Supply Targets’ (Parkin 1977). 
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
Memory, as Friedman has acknowledged, is not an entirely reliable source of 
historical information (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 115, 123, 112).  Patinkin (1976, 
64) was also justified in concluding that “an author is not necessarily the best 
authority on the history of the development of his own work; and by definition he 
certainly is not an objective authority” [Patinkin’s emphasis].  However, the archival 
material clearly indicates that Friedman’s account of the oral tradition contains a large 
kernel of truth with respect to Mints in 1932, even though he may have exaggerated 
the extent of this tradition by invoking the names of Knight, Simons and Viner.   
 
Patinkin (1977, 125) regarded the history of economic thought as an “empirical 
science” and suggested that a “regression line” approach was warranted.  But when 
Martin Bronfenbrenner disagreed with his evaluation of Simons’ influence, Patinkin 
(chapter 5 [1969/1981], 246) noted that “Bronfenbrenner’s recollections refer to the 
period 1934-36 whereas mine are for 1941-46” adding “I am not sure it is relevant”.  
It was a reasonable first approximation for Patinkin to extrapolate backwards from 
1944, although the presence of a structural break in 1936 rendered his extrapolation 
unreliable.  It was, in any case, an inadequate substitute for an examination of the 
1932 archival material.   
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Friedman (correspondence to the author 29 October 1999) regards “the fuss over the 
Chicago oral tradition” as “much ado about very little” which has produced a lot of 
“wasted paper”.  But as Stigler (1988, 153-4) pointed out (in a brief reference to the 
dispute over the oral tradition) Friedman was “quite talented in outraging his 
intellectual opponents”.  Moreover, Friedman used the quantity theory “as a powerful 
weapon to attack the Keynesian theory”.  Viner (chapter 46 [1936], 152) noted that 
Keynes had identified liquidity preference as a “source of trouble” for the economy; 
Friedman identified (apparently) stable money demand functions as a major source of 
trouble for Keynesians.   
 
Keynes (1922, vi) edited a series of books written by those who perceived themselves 
to be “orthodox members of the Cambridge School of Economics”.  Robertson (1922, 
viii), the author of the handbook on Money, defended Keynes’ (JMK 11 [1911], 375-
76) assertion about the quantity theory “oral tradition” as “an almost pardonable 
exaggeration”.  Patinkin was not inclined to be so tolerant towards Friedman.xl  To 
Patinkin it was as if Moses had presented a ‘Restatement’ that perverted the wisdom 
transmitted to him on Mount Sinai.  The intensity of the resulting controversy can 
only be adequately explained by reference to the passions engendered by the modern 
configuration of economics.    
  
Both sides of the Keynesian-monetarist debate claimed that the evidence supported 
their conclusions in “a strikingly one-sided way” (Friedman 1963, 8; Desai 1981, 
203).  However, Patinkin performed a great service by undertaking such a one-sided 
historical examination.  Had he been more dispassionate, and not played the role of 
‘economist-as-matador’ the dispute may never taken place and we would presumably 
know a lot less about the evolution of monetary thought than we do today.  Hence the 
dispute over the oral tradition illustrates the pervasiveness of the principle of 
unintended consequences.  Patinkin, like Friedman, was “led by an invisible hand to 
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1968 stating that “I’ve found no explicit mention of the demand for money” in 
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viii
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xi
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 Richard Kahn Papers, RFK/13/90/1/44-51. 
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reasoning about the relationship between prices and money during hyperinflation.  
Patinkin (16th May 1955) informed Cagan that he “felt hopelessly stupid … All this 
makes me now feel that I am missing the main point of your study.  Maybe I’ll just 




 In his discussion of real balances, Patinkin (1952, 269-70) raised “the interesting 
question of how this set of forces, [emphasised by Haberler and Pigou] could have 
been overlooked by Keynesian economists, in general, and Keynes himself, in 
particular.  Questions of this type can rarely be answered satisfactorily – and perhaps 
should not even be asked.  Nevertheless, I think it is both possible and instructive to 
trace through the exact chain of errors in Keynes’s reasoning which caused him to 
overlook these factors”.  Keynes’ “fundamental error” related to the relationship 
between real cash balances and consumption.  Keynes erred by concentrating 
“exclusively” on the tendency of real cash balances “to lower interest rates” through 
the liquidity function.  Patinkin then added a footnote: “the following passage [from 
the General Theory] is especially interesting: ‘It is, therefore, on the effect of a falling 
wage– and price-level on the demand for money [Patinkin’s emphasis] that those who 
believe in self-adjusting quality of the economic system must rest the weight of their 
argument; though I am not aware that they had done so’”.  Patinkin concluded that 
“looking back on the nature of these errors, we cannot but be struck by the irony that 
they should have emanated from the man who did most to demonstrate the 
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xix
 On 19th April 1937, he wrote to Roy Harrod explaining that his review had stopped 
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xx
 Eprime Eshag in his thesis on From Marshall to Keynes an Essay on the Monetary 
Theory of the Cambridge School noted that “Keynes’ propositions on incentives to 
liquidity were largely obtained from Marshall’s analysis of the demand for money” 
(1963, 65; see also Bigg 1990, 99; Bridel 1987, 28, 130).  Patinkin (chapter 36 [1974], 
20, n17) disagreed with Eshag’s conclusions.  Joan Robinson (1933, 77) complained 
that the “simple minded reader [of the Treatise] finds that the Quantity Theory has led 
him to concentrate too much on Demand”.  George Shackle (1967, 215, 209) 
concluded that the Treatise provided “a better account of liquidity preference, because 
more impregnated with the feel of markets and their constant tip-toe alertness to every 
breath of suggestion, than is to be found in the General Theory”.  In Shackle’s 
judgement, the Treatise was “in large part, an analysis of the economy’s total need for 
a stock of money into various sources of demand”.       
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xxi
 On November 14th 1932, Keynes delivered a section of a lecture headed 
“Parameters of the Money Economy”.  In notes taken from these lectures, Robert 
Bryce recorded: “Quantity [Theory] of Money [has] these [three] 3 fundamental 
factors – of market and psychology and attitude to[wards] future liquidity preference, 
expectation of quasi-rent – and state of time preference”.  From Keynes’ lecture on 
December 4th 1933, Lorie Tarshis recorded: “‘liquidity preference’- really the demand 
for money – the way of summing up the eagerness of people to hold their wealth in 
money rather than other forms … Motives for holding money, as in Treatise … We 
now have the essential determinants of the rate of interest – A (L [iquidity] 
Pref[erence]) – W (State of News) – M (Quantity of Money) … This is Keynes 
‘quantity equation’ … Keynes thinks it best to relate M to [the rate of interest]” 
(Rymes 1985, A39, J33, J36).  
 
xxii




 Keynes may also have been stimulated by the assertion that “there is and can be 
no economic Einstein” and by the statement that the “the pure doctrine of laissez-faire 
had gone and we could no longer think in the abstract terms of Ricardo” (Phelan 
1931, 155, 191).  As he was pondering how to maximise the influence of the work 
that would, from late 1933, be called The General Theory (second draft table of 
contents), he met Albert Einstein, the author of another theory with a similar name 
and a similar claim: “The old theory is a special limiting case of the new one” 
(Einstein, cited by Clark 1984, 257).  Keynes had used the Einstein analogy before 
(JMK IX [1929], 91), and was aware of the rhetorical possibilities of presenting his 
revolution as the social science equivalent of the revolution that had conquered the 
physical sciences in the inter-war period: “The classical economists resemble 
Euclidean geometers in a non-Euclidean world ... the postulates of classical theory are 
applicable to a special case only and not to the general case, the situation which it 
assumes being a limiting point of the possible positions of equilibrium ... We are thus 
led to a more general theory which includes the classical theory with which we are 
familiar, as a special case” (1936, 16, 3, vii). 
 
xxiv
 Currie (5 August 1971) explained to Alan Sweezy that his career had been blocked 
at Harvard by Harold Burbank, Gottfried Haberler and Harris who “didn’t get on the 
[Keynesian] bandwagon until it was perfectly safe to do so and he had his position 
secured at Harvard”.  Lauchlin Currie Papers, Correspondence, Alan Sweezy file.  
Tavlas (chapter 34 [1997], 170, n10) recounts that Harris (whose surname was Cohen 
before he changed it) was the only Jewish member of the Harvard Economics 
department of the 1920s who received tenure.   
  
xxv
 There is a third 330 bibliography which obviously relates to a later version of the 
course. Milton Friedman Papers, Box 5. 
 
xxvi
 Don Patinkin Papers, Box 32. 
 
xxvii
 In the third bibliography the entry reads “Fisher, Purchasing Power of Money, 
chapters 1-6 and 8”.  Thus it seems likely that Fisher figured slightly more 
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 The remaining sections of chapter 14 discussed the Fisher quantity equation and 
its relationship with the Cambridge quantity equation. 
 
xxix
 Samuelson (1996, 148-9) stated: “it’s not true, I’ll say categorically, what Milton 
Friedman at one time tried to sell: that there was a very subtle Chicago oral tradition 
on the demand for money and monetary theory.  Read Robertson’s handbook on 
Money, and you will have plumbed the depths of Chicago’s monetary sophistication”.    
 
xxx
 Robertson (1928, 17) prefaced this chapter with the same words from Humpty 
Dumpty that Patinkin (chapter 6 [1972/1974], 111) later used as the preface to his 
assault on Friedman (When I use a word … it means just what I choose it to mean”).   
 
xxxi
 On Roosevelt’s inauguration day, 4th March 1933, thirty-eight states had closed 
their banks and, for the first time since 1848, the Chicago Board of Trade shut its 
doors (Leuchtenberg 1963, 39).  Re-establishing confidence in the money supply and 
the banking system was Roosevelt’s first priority.  Friedman recalled that the collapse 
of the monetary system and the associated calamities “did not pass unnoticed in the 
Economics Department” (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 40).  In April 1933, Knight 
(1933, 244) wrote in the JPE that “the devil in person could not have invented a 
device more obviously ‘intended’ than is commercial banking to increase the 
amplitude of any incipient swing by an indefinite multiple”.    
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 Don Patinkin Papers, Box 2. 
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 Don Patinkin Papers, Box 2. 
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 Don Patinkin Papers, Box 32. 
 
xxxviii
 Friedman Papers, Correspondence, Robbins file. 
 
xxxix
 Don Patinkin Papers, Box 2.  Perhaps Friedman was growing weary of his 
opponents.  On 30 December 1970, the New York Times reported that Johnson’s Ely 
Lecture was an indication that Friedman’s influence over policy was waning (Silk 
1970).  In March 1971, Friedman had apparently just heard that Johnson’s Lecture 
(chapter 8 [1971]) was to be published in both Encounter and the American Economic 
Association Papers and Proceedings.  The previous month, Murray Rothbard (1971, 
3, 4) described Friedman as the “Establishment’s Court Libertarian … In many ways 
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 There are some similarities between Robertson’s relationship with Keynes before 
and after the writing of the General Theory, and Patinkin’s relationship with 
Friedman before and after 1956 (although Patinkin had never been Friedman’s student 
or long term colleague).  Patinkin (1980, 10) referred to the Keynes-Robertson 
“vendetta” as “an originally close relationship steadily deteriorating over the years 
into repeated disagreements, inability to communicate, and mutual distrust – all 
exacerbated by deep emotional forces whose nature it is not for economists as such to 
analyse” (see also Blaug 1986, 205; Danes 1987, 210).  Earlier, Patinkin (1958, 316-
7) in his rather contemptuous account of the revival of the liquidity preference-
loanable funds dispute had referred to the “psychology of intellectual processes”.  In 
his History of Thought course at the University of Western Ontario, Patinkin 
complained, or at least noted, that “economists seem to have some deep need to use 
terms like ‘classical’, ‘neoclassical’, ‘Marxian’, ‘Keynesian’”.  He also stated that 
“tracing development of thought – how the mind works – history of ideas” was a 
“Useless subject – you’ve been warned”.  Don Patinkin Papers, Box 20 (see also 
Backhouse 2002).        
